The United States announced on Sunday that it is preparing to deploy units of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense system in Israel, accompanied by U.S. troops to assist in its operation. This move is part of Washington’s efforts to bolster Israeli air defenses in the wake of missile attacks launched by Iran in early October 2023. The Pentagon spokesperson characterized this action as part of a broader adjustment made by the U.S. military in recent months to support Israel.
This is not the first time the U.S. has deployed THAAD in the Middle East; the system was also sent to Israel in 2019 for joint exercises. However, the timing and context of this deployment differ significantly this time, with heightened anticipation regarding Israel’s response to the Iranian missile strike, which could compel Tehran to escalate its actions.
Israeli Air Defense System
THAAD, which stands for “Terminal High Altitude Area Defense,” is an advanced U.S. missile defense system designed to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles during their terminal phase (re-entry into the atmosphere), with a range of up to 200 kilometers and an altitude of 150 kilometers.
The THAAD interceptors utilize a “hit-to-kill” approach, meaning they destroy missiles by directly colliding with them using kinetic energy, rather than relying on explosive warheads. This reliance on precise targeting necessitates an advanced radar system like the AN/TPY-2, capable of detecting and tracking small, fast-moving ballistic missiles from long distances.
While THAAD is not currently a core component of Israel’s defense system, the Israeli military operates a multi-layered air defense network, each designed to counter specific threats at varying ranges and altitudes. The Iron Dome, for example, is primarily designed for short-range threats like rockets and artillery shells, intercepting them at ranges between 4 and 70 kilometers.
Following that is the David’s Sling system, designed to intercept medium-range and large-caliber missiles with a range of 40 to 300 kilometers. Lastly, the Arrow defense system, including Arrow 2 and the latest Arrow 3, is intended to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere, making it suitable for countering intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
THAAD’s capability to intercept ballistic missiles at a higher range and altitude overlaps significantly with the Arrow system’s operational scope, indicating that its deployment aims to extend protection over a broader area, driven by increasing concerns about Iran’s evolving ballistic missile capabilities.
Iran’s Missile Arsenal
Ballistic missiles are defined as missiles that follow a “ballistic trajectory” to deliver warheads to predetermined targets. This trajectory resembles a massive arc, predetermined at the moment of launch. Initially, the missile is powered by engines that propel it into the upper atmosphere or even outer space, then it coasts along a path outside the atmosphere before descending towards its target, guided by gravity.
Iran possesses several advantages with its ballistic missile program, including the ability to reach high speeds for rapid surprise attacks. These missiles can be manufactured in a wide range of distances, from under a thousand kilometers to intercontinental ranges (11,000 to 12,000 kilometers). Although there are no official data on the number of Iranian ballistic missiles, U.S. Central Command General Kenneth McKenzie has stated that Tehran possesses “over 3,000” ballistic missiles, aside from its cruise missile stockpiles.
Furthermore, Iran has made significant advancements in the accuracy of its ballistic missiles over the past decade. Some Iranian missiles, like the Fateh-313 and Qiam-1, utilize highly accurate guidance systems. The Fateh-313 is a short-range ballistic missile (approximately 500 kilometers) equipped with an advanced guidance system that includes inertial navigation and possibly satellite guidance, ensuring high targeting precision. Meanwhile, the Qiam-1 employs a guidance system that combines inertial navigation and terminal guidance, enhancing its accuracy against specific targets.
Iran has also focused heavily on developing solid-fuel missiles, which accelerate launch times compared to liquid fuel, making them ideal for rapid response scenarios or surprise strikes. Solid fuel is more stable, facilitating rapid preparation and transportation of missiles, and is more suitable for multi-stage missiles, critical for long-range and intercontinental missiles where accuracy and reliability are paramount.
The Moment of Confrontation
However, improving the accuracy and range of ballistic missiles alone does not enable Iran to penetrate Israel’s multi-layered air defense systems, especially after the U.S. has enhanced them with the deployment of THAAD. Therefore, Iran relies on additional tactics to challenge and overwhelm these defenses.
One key tactic is overwhelming them with sheer numbers. Regardless of a defense system’s strength and accuracy, it has a limit to its interception capacity, diminishing effectiveness beyond that threshold. For instance, each Iron Dome battery has around 60 interceptors, and Israel reportedly operates a little over ten Iron Dome batteries, meaning it can intercept “hundreds of missiles” before needing to replenish its interceptors.
This indicates that for short-range missile attacks, a sustained barrage of one to two thousand missiles in a very short timeframe could strain the Iron Dome’s capacity, allowing some missiles to reach their targets. A coordinated attack involving hundreds of medium-range ballistic missiles could similarly exhaust David’s Sling capabilities, while dozens of long-range missiles launched simultaneously could overwhelm the Arrow system, including THAAD.
Indeed, this was precisely what Iran did in its recent strike on a smaller scale. According to analyses by the Wall Street Journal, satellite imagery indicates that Iran managed to overwhelm Israeli air defense systems in certain targeted areas. This may be a contributing factor to the U.S. decision to bolster Israel with additional THAAD batteries. This strike differed from a previous one in April 2024, as it employed more accurate and faster ballistic missiles aimed at specific targets with significant precision.
Moreover, there are underlying technical issues within Israeli defense systems. For example, Theodore Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology argues that the Iron Dome’s interception rates for incoming projectiles from Gaza are below 10%. This is because the interceptor often fails to hit the incoming missile directly, instead detonating nearby, failing to destroy the warhead and potentially allowing it to crash to the ground despite a “technical” interception success.
This perspective aligns with evaluations from Richard M. Lloyd, a former warhead expert at Raytheon, and others within the Israeli military, who estimate the system’s actual effectiveness to be between 5% to a maximum of 40%.
Iran’s Triad of Capabilities
In truth, Iran’s missile capabilities far exceed what is necessary to inflict significant damage on Israel if the political decision is made to do so, despite the imbalance of power favoring Israel.
The Islamic Revolutionary System has long recognized that Tehran will never be as powerful as its adversaries, given the constraints imposed on it and the nature of those adversaries. Therefore, it suffices for Iran to deter them or cause them severe harm if deterrence fails. This aligns with an article published in 1994 by nuclear physicist Peter Zimmerman, who asserted that countries like Iran do not need a “gold medal” in military technology to be effective and ready for confrontation; often, “bronze medal” technology is more than sufficient.
Zimmerman’s point is that military technology can be adapted in such a way that less precise weapons become more effective. For instance, Iran is developing three offensive weapons rather than just one: ballistic missiles, combat drones, and low-flying cruise missiles that can evade radar detection.
Iran has made significant strides in producing combat drones, with no better evidence than the Shahed 136 suicide drones. By early 2023, this drone was a critical component of the Russian arsenal in the Ukraine conflict, evident from the increased frequency and intensity of attacks throughout Ukraine, where the Shahed has demonstrated remarkable effectiveness in its missions, prompting the Russians to develop a more advanced version called “Shahed-238.”
Additionally, Iran has developed a variety of cruise missiles, which possess stealth capabilities due to their low-flying flight patterns and maneuverability akin to aircraft, making them difficult to detect by radar systems and intercept with traditional missile defense systems. Examples include the Somar cruise missile, which has a long-range of between 700 to 3,000 kilometers, and the Hoveyzeh, with a range of 1,350 kilometers.
This means Iran can execute a joint warfare strategy, which integrates different combat arms to achieve synergistic effects, striking the enemy with multiple fronts simultaneously. Consequently, the actions a foe must take to defend against one strike render them more vulnerable to another. For instance, Iranian drones could target air defense radars in the early stages of a comprehensive attack, diverting other air defense capabilities to counter the drone assault, leaving the way clear for ballistic missile and cruise missile strikes.
Furthermore, these drones typically launch in swarms, varying in function, range, and capacity, with some directly attacking and others loitering to exploit weaknesses identified by reconnaissance drones. This complicates the strike and can manifest in multi-directional attacks, further overwhelming Israeli air defense systems. For instance, Iranian strikes could coincide with attacks from the south (Houthis in Yemen) and the north (Hezbollah in Lebanon) using various missiles alongside drones, placing greater strain on air defense systems.
Hypersonic Missiles
In addition to developing missiles, overwhelming defenses, and diversifying strike types and directions, Iran is enhancing its ability to penetrate multi-layered air defenses by developing hypersonic missiles as part of its expanding missile program. In November 2022
