By: Suat Delgen Turkish naval warfare officer-turned-defense analyst
The Caspian Sea (the term “sea” is not legally defined; it simply reflects historical usage) is a body of water with its own distinctive geographical features and rich biodiversity. It is estimated that the majority of the world’s black caviar is sourced from the Caspian Sea. The region is regarded as an important energy basin, thanks to its rich natural gas and oil deposits.
The legal status of the Caspian Sea was recognized as an inland sea between Iran and the Soviet Union until 1991. In accordance with the treaties signed between the two countries in 1921 and 1940, both countries were granted joint rights on the use of the sea. However, no clear provisions were determined on how the sea and its underground resources would be shared. In 1991, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the number of Caspian littoral states increased to five, with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan joining the ranks. The new situation further complicated the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan proposed that the Caspian should be recognized as a lake and divided into national sectors in accordance with the International Lake Status Treaties, and that the seabed should be divided by the “median line” method. Russia and Iran, however, asserted that the Caspian Sea was a shared resource, in accordance with the principle of “condominium,” and that the sea and its natural resources should be used jointly by all littoral states. They drew inspiration from the treaties signed between the Soviet Union and Iran in 1921 and 1940. Iran proposed that if the Caspian is to be divided into national sectors, each country should be allocated an equal share (20%) without taking into account the length of the coast. Various summits and meetings were held throughout the 1990s and 2000s. However, despite the best efforts of all involved, no consensus was reached due to differing opinions.
After lengthy discussions, the littoral states reached an agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea on August 12, 2018. This agreement was reached with the aim of ensuring the effective use of energy resources and regional stability, taking into account the regional developments and economic dynamics. The parties agreed on the importance of developing neighborly relations, regional integration, peaceful settlement of conflicts, protection of natural and natural resources, and on the need for non-coastal states to refrain from having troops in the Caspian Sea. In accordance with this agreement, the Caspian Sea was defined as a body of water surrounded by the territory of the littoral states and divided into four distinct zones.
– With regard to the inland waters, it is proposed that it encompasses the inland waters situated inland from the main line, which is determined from the coasts of each state.
– With regard to the territorial waters, we would like to propose the following: It is understood that each state has a territorial sea of 15 nautical miles from the baseline. It is worth noting that the relevant coastal state is sovereign over the territorial sea.
– With regard to fishing zones, we would like to propose the following: A 10-nautical-mile-wide zone adjacent to the territorial sea. It is our understanding that states have exclusive fishing rights in this zone.
– Common sea area: It is our understanding that the waters beyond the fishing zone constitute the common sea area and are open to the common use of all coastal states.
In accordance with the Convention, each state is entitled to exclusive rights to explore and exploit seabed resources within its own seabed sector. However, the Convention does not explicitly state the method to be followed for the delimitation of the seabed. Instead, it merely emphasizes that the parties concerned should agree on this issue peacefully.
The seabed in the northern part of the Caspian Sea between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan was shared through a series of bilateral agreements between 1998 and 2003. In these agreements, the parties defined the borders using the midline management approach. However, there are still some differences of opinion between the parties regarding the sharing of the seabed and the demarcation of borders in the southern part of the Caspian Sea. While Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have expressed their willingness to accept the use of the median line, Iran has put forth the argument that the seabed should be shared equally between the parties.
In 2021, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan agreed to rename the Kepez/Serdar field to Dostluk and to conduct joint exploration. The two countries met in Ashgabat on January 24-25, 2023, with the intention of determining the seabed boundaries between them. The Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan foreign ministries have announced that they are continuing to discuss the provisions of the draft agreement on the delimitation of the seabed of the Caspian Sea between the two countries.
While there is a high probability of a compromise between the two countries in the near future, it seems very difficult for Iran to say yes to a joint sharing agreement on this issue. This is because the smallest seabed would remain in Iran’s hands if the midline management approach were to be used.
It may be perceived that an agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on the sharing of the seabed could potentially remove an important obstacle to the transportation of Turkmen gas to Turkey or EU countries. However, it is worth noting that Article 14.1 of the convention allows for the laying of submarine cables and pipelines in the Caspian Sea bed, while Article 14.2 stipulates that pipelines must not damage the seabed and must comply with the “Protocol on the Protection of the Caspian Sea and its Environment”, which entered into force in 2006. In accordance with Article 15 of the Convention, all countries are collectively responsible for environmental protection. This article appears to grant the parties the right to object and veto any project.
As a result, despite the legal status of the Caspian Sea having been determined by the convention signed on August 12, 2018, the dispute over the sharing of the seabed continues, stemming from Iran’s demands. It is possible that Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan may reach an agreement in the near future on the sharing of the relevant parts of the seabed and may agree on the pipeline passing through their sectors. However, as highlighted in the preamble of the convention, the driving forces behind the parties’ willingness to compromise can be found in the promotion of cooperation among the Caspian littoral states and the prevention of external interference in the Caspian Sea. In light of the current circumstances, it seems unlikely that Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan will decide on a pipeline project by reaching an agreement among themselves and implement it with the encouragement or guidance of the EU or Turkey. It is also not possible to realize a project that leaves Russia out of the equation. Moreover, it would be beneficial to consider the possibility of gaining Russia’s explicit or implicit support as a potential solution to overcome Iran’s objections. Given the current power dynamics in the Caspian Sea region, it is highly improbable that a pipeline project will come to fruition in the near future without Russia’s explicit approval or tacit consent, as any such endeavor would likely face significant obstacles and resistance from the regional power.
This article is exclusive for Mideast Discourse
