Steven Sahiounie, journalist and political commentator
US President Donald J.Trump is now in office, and the Middle East collectively is waiting to see what will the US policy be, and will it help or hurt. Lebanon holds strategic interests for the US, and has a new President and Prime Minister. With so many diverse issues at play in Lebanon, Steven Sahiounie of MidEastDiscourse interviewed well known Lebanese journalist and writer, Jamal Cheaib, to get his take on the key challenges facing Lebanon.
#1. Steven Sahiounie (SS): Lebanon has selected the President of the ICJ, Nawaf Salam, as a Prime Minister of Lebanon. In your opinion, will he be able to form a government and why?
Jamal Cheaip (JC): The selection of Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister may indicate a push towards reform, based on his statements (though experience will reveal the accuracy of this perception). It is clear that he relies heavily on his work with international institutions, his legal expertise, and the support he received to secure his nomination as Prime Minister. However, Lebanon’s political system, as structured under the Taif Agreement, and the entrenched interests of various political parties with their sectarian backgrounds (at least in terms of representation), could pose significant obstacles to forming a government.
Without broad consensus among these factions, and while attention was focused on the “Shia representation issue,” it became evident that the real obstacles lie elsewhere—particularly in the fragmentation of Christian blocs into two major factions and several smaller ones. Additionally, the distribution of Sunni parliamentary representation among medium-sized blocs adds further complexity to the process of selecting candidates for ministerial positions. This stands in contrast to the situation of the “Shia duo,” which has already agreed in advance on the allocation of ministerial portfolios and the criteria for their occupants.
These complications are likely to delay Salam’s efforts to form a government swiftly, as was the case with previous Prime Ministers. However, Salam may leverage his ability to rally diverse regional and international support to overcome these challenges and move forward with forming the first government under the presidency of Joseph Aoun.
#2. SS: President Trump is now in office. In your opinion, what will the relationship between the Lebanon and the US look like?
JC: It remains unclear whether the newly elected U.S. President will adopt the same policies implemented during his previous term. In that era, the United States pursued an aggressive “non-military warfare” approach against Hezbollah, escalating sanctions that severely impacted Lebanon’s economy. The administration sought to impose a comprehensive ban on dealings with “public and private institutions and companies” linked to Hezbollah’s management or operations. It also targeted Hezbollah’s political allies, imposing sanctions and travel bans on them.
If this policy continues, U.S.-Lebanon relations are likely to remain strained, despite any efforts by the U.S. administration to foster the success of President Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam’s tenure, maintain American aid, or sustain diplomatic engagement on security, economic, and political matters. The U.S.’s steadfast commitment to “Israel’s security” and its overarching goal of isolating Hezbollah will likely perpetuate tensions and instability in bilateral relations. This dynamic may persist unless the Trump administration becomes preoccupied with broader international issues and refrains from interfering in Lebanon’s internal affairs, particularly regarding the ongoing conflict with Israel.
#3. SS: Lebanon has elected a new President. In your opinion, will he be able to get Lebanon out of the current financial, political and social crisis?
JC: The new president will face immense challenges in addressing the financial collapse, widespread corruption, and political paralysis. This is primarily due to the limited decision-making powers granted to the presidency under the Taif Agreement, which shifted executive authority to the Council of Ministers as a collective body.
While symbolic leadership may inspire hope among citizens—whether they support the new president, voted for him, or did not—there remains a shared aspiration among all Lebanese for positive change that alleviates the severity of the financial and economic crisis. The collective desire is to restore Lebanon’s path to development, progress, and prosperity.
However, genuine change will require structural reforms, a serious and transparent commitment to combating corruption free of political vendettas or sectarian bias, international support, and an end to sectarian divisions. Achieving these goals will depend on the president’s ability to navigate entrenched interests, earn the trust of the Lebanese people, and secure broad national consensus on a comprehensive package of reforms and their implementation.
#4. SS: Israel has signed a ceasefire with both Lebanon and Gaza . In your opinion, will it work out, and what is the role of the Arab countries in the future of Gaza?
JC: The sustainability of the ceasefire depends on the willingness of all parties to adhere to its terms. In the case of Gaza and Lebanon, with an opposing party like Israel, no analyst or observer can guarantee its full commitment to the agreements it makes. Historically, Israel has often undermined the implementation of agreements with resistance factions or even normalization deals with Arab states. It frequently manipulates the interpretation of these agreements to serve its interests and secure additional advantages. When these benefits cannot be achieved through evasion or manipulation, Israel has resorted to renewed aggression and territorial expansion, particularly through land grabs, settlement construction, and the expropriation of Palestinian land and homes, as witnessed in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, even after the Oslo Accords and the Wadi Araba Agreement.
Today, as the ceasefire agreement in Gaza is being implemented, Israel is already issuing threats of launching a military campaign in the West Bank while making promises to hardline groups to encourage and fund the construction of more settlements there.
In Lebanon, despite its full compliance with the terms of the ceasefire, Israeli forces continue to occupy border villages even as the preliminary 60-day period nears its end. These forces are conducting demolitions, destroying entire neighborhoods, looting homes, and dismantling infrastructure. They have even gone so far as to steal centuries-old olive trees.
As for Arab states, historical experience does not offer much hope for their playing a meaningful or effective role in ensuring the stability of the ceasefire in Lebanon and Gaza. However, I believe there is now an opportunity for them to at least mitigate “tensions and wars” and restore stability to the region. This would involve exerting international pressure during the transitional period of Trump’s second term, leveraging his administration’s focus on economic challenges, and emphasizing to the new president that regional stability, including in Arab countries, aligns with the strategic interests of both the Middle East and the United States. While achieving decisive and lasting solutions to the conflict may not be immediately feasible, ensuring sustainable security is crucial for all parties involved.
#5. SS: There is massive destruction in Lebanon that needs to be rebuilt. In your opinion, will corrupt politicians rebuild the country, while stealing the aid coming to Lebanon, or is there any chance of an end to corruption in the rebuilding process?
JC: Corruption has long been entrenched in Lebanon, contradicting the nostalgic narrative of “ideal conditions” in the 1950s and 1960s. Such claims often ignore or deliberately overlook politically and sectarian-motivated realities, such as the “Intra crisis,” questionable banking deals, and the preferential treatment granted to the entertainment and tourism sectors at the expense of public assets, particularly coastal and riverfront properties and summer resorts. Meanwhile, rural and peripheral areas in the north, Bekaa, and the south suffered from long-term neglect and deprivation.
Legitimate concerns exist regarding the potential misuse of aid designated for reconstruction, as funds and assistance intended for balanced development were previously misappropriated or poorly managed. While international donors are now inclined to demand transparency and oversight mechanisms—such as working directly with NGOs or imposing conditions on aid distribution—the experience of aid management following the Beirut Port explosion revealed an even darker reality. Corruption appears to be deeply entrenched within civil society organizations and NGOs, sometimes surpassing the levels observed in public institutions.
Though eradicating corruption in the near term seems unlikely, there is growing pressure to establish mechanisms for grassroots oversight, independent of both government institutions and NGOs. These mechanisms could involve diverse local political and sectarian forces forming a “shadow government” to oversee any entity or organization managing or distributing aid, grants, or government reconstruction projects. Such an approach could serve as the most viable foundation for ensuring transparency and direct public accountability in the management of reconstruction efforts.
#6. SS: Some experts say that Hezbollah is defeated, and some expert say the opposite. In your opinion, where does Hezbollah stand today in Lebanon, and in the region?
JC: Before addressing the contentious question posed by Hezbollah’s adversaries regarding whether the party has been “defeated,” it is essential to define what constitutes defeat. Notably, Israel itself, the initiator of the war, acknowledged that it failed to achieve its declared goal of militarily eliminating Hezbollah and dismantling its capabilities. Israel had set shifting objectives for its most recent war on Lebanon, starting with neutralizing the threat posed by Hezbollah to northern settlements and ensuring the safe return of settlers to their homes. These objectives later escalated to declaring its intent to crush Hezbollah, destroy its strategic and tactical capabilities, and deplete its diverse arsenal.
Does “defeat” then refer to the aggressor’s failure to achieve its goals? Or does it mean agreeing to a ceasefire, which was Hezbollah’s primary demand, particularly since the party had publicly announced through its Secretary-General that it had no intention of expanding the conflict or igniting broader hostilities? Indeed, Hezbollah spent an entire year working to spare Lebanon the sparks of war.
On the ground, after Hezbollah opened a support front for Gaza and Israel launched its ground invasion, the results were far from Israel’s declared strategic aims. Its objectives fluctuated as it failed to achieve geographic advancements of significance. Meanwhile, Hezbollah consistently targeted settlements, cities, and military bases inside Israel. It carried out a large-scale missile strike, bolstered by attack drones, which penetrated deep into Israeli security zones, reaching areas south of Tel Aviv. In the war’s final stages, Hezbollah continued launching rockets at Israeli targets and settlements in the north from positions along Lebanon’s border with occupied Palestine. As documented by Israeli soldiers’ own cameras, Hezbollah fighters were still engaging Israeli forces in villages Israel claimed to have captured, as well as in border areas adjacent to Palestine.
In light of the facts following Israel’s 72-day war on Lebanon, it is evident from a military perspective that Israel failed to achieve its primary goal of dismantling Hezbollah’s strategic and tactical capabilities. This was despite the intense and extensive airstrikes conducted by the Israeli air force on what it claimed were Hezbollah’s weapons depots, installations, and military facilities.
Some argue that Israel’s initial wave of over 1,500 airstrikes, targeting Hezbollah’s political and military leadership, was a severe and crippling blow, particularly with the martyrdom of its Secretary-General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, along with several top commanders and field leaders. However, Hezbollah’s operational and organizational resilience, as evidenced by its fighters’ performance in ground battles and the swift restoration of its structures, including the election of Sheikh Naim Qassem as the new Secretary-General, quickly neutralized the impact of this blow. Israel’s inability to capitalize on its early gains undermined its efforts to achieve the broader objectives of its campaign.
Perhaps the most telling indicator of the failure of Israel’s war goals is the inability of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government to convince settlers to return to northern settlements. This challenge was further compounded by many settlers’ outright refusal to return, with a significant number choosing to remain in their areas of displacement, where they established businesses and livelihoods.
Regionally, given the developments in Syria and the ongoing anticipation regarding the priorities of the United States in the region—and their implications for U.S. relations with Arab and Gulf states—the question of Hezbollah’s position and regional role becomes speculative. With major regional powers awaiting the outcome and direction of these changes, it is natural for Hezbollah to adopt a watchful and proactive stance, aiming to safeguard its local and regional role. This approach is rooted not only in its military strength but also in its substantial popular representation and its political, social, educational, and cultural contributions.
Hezbollah has successfully weathered the aftermath of the most recent war, preventing Israel from achieving its objectives. Over the course of an entire year, it provided crucial support to Gaza’s resistance. Gaza’s resilience during the 471-day conflict—one of the most intense and brutal wars in recent decades—culminated in a victory on terms it had agreed upon more than six months earlier. This achievement has bolstered the standing of resistance factions and elevated their status among the region’s and the world’s peoples.
Hezbollah’s steadfastness, coupled with its pivotal support for Gaza, has reinforced the principle of resistance, demonstrating its ability to confront challenges, adapt to changing circumstances, and persist despite escalating adversity. This underscores Hezbollah’s enduring influence and the resilience of the resistance movement in the region.
Steven Sahiounie is a two-time award-winning journalist
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