Steven Sahiounie, journalist and political commentator
On August 8, President Donald Trump hosted a White House summit between Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev and the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, which resulted in a preliminary peace deal to end the decades-long conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is a corridor which could become a mammoth transport hub between Turkiye, Azerbaijan and Central Asia.The flow of Central Asian hydrocarbons to Turkiye and Europe, could boost the regional economy, at the expense of Russia and China.Armenia was hesitant to allow Azeri access to the corridor, but Trump reassured Pashinyan, and closed the deal.
Steven Sahiounie of MidEastDiscourse interviewed Vera Yacoubian, a part-time instructor in Political Science and History at both the American University of Beirut and Haigazian University. In addition to her academic roles, she serves as the Executive Director of the Armenian National Committee of the Middle East as an advocate for the Armenian Genocide and regional issues.
1. Steven Sahiounie (SS): What strategic interests motivated the United States to broker the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal, particularly the development of the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity”?
Vera Yacoubian (VY): The U.S. engaged in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace talks, aiming at more than a temporary halt to fighting. Washington treated the expected deal as leverage to reshape the South Caucasus in a manner designed to marginalize both Moscow and Tehran influence, who for years dominated the region’s security arrangements. At the core of this recalibration stood the proposed “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), a transit axis crossing southern Armenia that would connect Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan exclave and, from there, to Turkey. By advocating this corridor, the U.S. intended to weave a new east-west trade and energy framework that evaded Russian and Iranian territory, thereby unlocking alternative channels for Caspian energy exports and integrating markets from Europe to Central Asia. Moreover, TRIPP would offer an alternative to China’s trade infrastructure, especially through Iran. TRIPP, in this arrangement, functioned both as a channel for commerce and as a geopolitical lever, tightening the region’s two primary states to the U.S. and EU economic and policy orbit.The agreement permitted the Trump administration to characterize the outcome as a notable diplomatic triumph, thereby bolstering its self-portrayal as a proficient arbiter capable of translating prolonged geopolitical disputes into concrete results. Simultaneously, the agreement fostered a measure of political capital with Turkey and Azerbaijan, while possibly creating a constructive, if tentative, impression within the European Union.
2. SS: How has the peace agreement reshaped the geopolitical dynamics of the South Caucasus, especially in relation to Russia and Iran’s influence in the region?
VY: The peace agreement has marked a decisive reconfiguration of power dynamics within the South Caucasus by positioning the United States in a decisive diplomatic role once reserved for Russia, and, to a lesser degree, Iran. As you know, for years, Moscow maintained a historical role as a mediator and military presence in Armenia, guaranteeing defense commitments while serving as the final arbiter in Yerevan–Baku disputes. While Iran views the corridor as a threat to its northern border security and economic leverage. It weakens its position by initiating a transport passage that sidesteps Iranian territory, thereby diminishing its leverage over cross-regional transit routes. Iran’s opposition to the corridor has been vocal, framed as a direct assault on its geopolitical agency and border integrity. The gradual Armenian approach to Western economic and diplomatic webs, paired with Azerbaijan’s consolidating lodgment within simultaneous U.S. and Turkish orbits, accelerates a West-leaning regional realignment, steadily constricting Kremlin and Iranian freedom within the South Caucasus. As for Turkey, it will benefit from direct access to Central Asia (an old dream come true), strengthening its regional role.
3. SS: What constitutional and territorial concessions did Armenia make to finalize the agreement, and how are these being received domestically?
VY: To finalize the peace agreement, unfortunately Armenia accepted a package of politically sensitive constitutional and territorial modifications that have provoked intense domestic scrutiny. The principal provision mandates the amendment or abrogation of constitutional phrasing that indicates Armenian authority over Nagorno-Karabakh, especially in the preamble statements inherited from the 1990 Declaration of Independence. This amendment, long insisted upon by Baku, constitutes Armenia’s formal renunciation of territorial ambitions and a public recognition of Azerbaijani sovereignty along the borders established by the Soviet-era administrative divisions. Armenia further consented to refrain from permitting any third-country military or oversight missions across the frontier, thereby necessitating the withdrawal of European Union monitoring teams the OSCE, and vowed to withdraw from ongoing legal cases against Azerbaijan in international courts. Such concessions have drawn pervasive distrust and, in certain segments, outright condemnation inside Armenia. Opposition groups and diaspora communities accuse the Pashinyan’s government of legitimizing ethnic cleansing and compromising sovereignty. Further, they denounced the deal as a surrender that erodes sovereignty and neglects the security of displaced Karabakh Armenians and the fates of the Armenian political prisoners of war in Azerbaijan.
4. SS: What are the implications of lifting U.S. restrictions on defense cooperation with Azerbaijan, and how might this affect regional security balances?
VY: The recent removal of U.S. defense cooperation restrictions on Azerbaijan—originally mandated by Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act—will significantly change the military equilibrium in the South Caucasus. Liberated from the embargo, Washington is now positioned to provide arms, facilitate joint training exercises, and deliver broader security assistance to Baku, thereby amplifying Azerbaijan’s already dominant military position vis-à-vis Armenia. In the immediate term, this development is poised to cement Baku’s trilateral strategic relationship with Washington and Ankara, stimulating its deterrent capabilities and potentially discouraging a renewed outbreak of hostilities. Simultaneously, however, it is likely to heighten Armenia’s apprehensions, particularly after its recent territorial concessions and amid a fracturing security relationship with Moscow that has failed to manifest decisively during Karabakh crisis. This may provoke concern in Armenia and Iran, both wary of increased U.S.–Azerbaijan cooperation. At the same time may increase the risks of destabilizing the fragile peace if not balanced by diplomatic oversight.
5. SS: To what extent does the peace deal address humanitarian concerns, such as the displacement of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh and political prisoners in Azerbaijan?
VY: Humanitarian concerns constitute a significant deficit in the peace deal. The mass displacement of over 120,000 ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023—an exodus triggered by Azerbaijan’s military advance—remains inadequately addressed. The agreement includes no enforceable commitments regarding the safe repatriation of the displaced population, the restitution of seized property, or the protection of Armenian cultural and religious sites across the territory. The Earlier, human rights NGOs highlighted the detention of Armenian prisoners of war and political dissidents in Azerbaijan, yet the final text conspicuously omits any assured timeline or mechanism for their repatriation, leaving several hundred individuals in precarious legal and diplomatic uncertainty. Armenian diaspora organizations have criticized the agreement for allegedly prioritizing geopolitical and commercial interests over human rights and accountability. The lack of comprehensive humanitarian provisions thus risks prolonging public grievances, exacerbating mistrust, and neglecting the human dimension of the conflict—factors which may jeopardize the long-term viability of the peace arrangement.
Steven Sahiounie is a two-time award-winning journalist.
