Steven Sahiounie, journalist and political commentator
Syria needs everything. After 14 years of conflict, the economy, infrastructure and security status are devastated. The UAE was one of the first Arab countries to hold out a helping hand to Damascus. Once the transition on December 8, 2024 took place, UAE has continued to strengthen its ties and commitment with Syria.
On June 1, Hassan Ahmed Al Shehhi, Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the Syrian Arab Republic, at the Damascus International Airport, “We are pleased to announce the resumption of operations by the UAE national carrier, FlyDubai, to the Syrian Arab Republic. This milestone reflects the deep-rooted and fraternal relations between the United Arab Emirates and Syria and underscores the UAE’s continued efforts to enhance regional and international air connectivity, strengthening economic ties and connecting people.”
The Arab Media Summit 2025 in Dubai was attended by Dr. Mohammad Nidal Al-Shaar, Syria’s Minister of Economy and Industry.
Al-Shaar said, “We need at least $1 trillion to reconstruct and rebuild a new Syria.”
He called the Syria-UAE cooperation a key driver in the reconstruction of the Syrian economy.
Recently, the Damascus administration has signed an investment agreement with DP World concerning the port of Tartus. Under the agreement, the UAE company operating in 40 countries, will invest $800 million in the terminal.
Syria and the Middle East are rapidly changing. Steven Sahiounie of MidEastDiscourse interviewed Dr. Gökhan Ereli, who is an expert on Middle Eastern International Relations, and has conducted research across the Arab Gulf countries.
#1. Steven Sahiounie (SS): The U.S. and Iran are currently holding a series of talks concerning the Iran nuclear program. In your opinion, if the sides happen to come to an agreement, how will this possibly affect the Arab Gulf states?
Gokhan Ereli (GE): For a long time, Iran’s backing of Shiite militias has destabilized regional states in the Middle East. It poses a serious challenge. However, during the course of 2023-2025, Iranian influence waned across the Middle East, especially in Syria and Lebanon. This decline coincided with a surge in Gulf engagement in those traditionally Iranian-influenced areas, particularly Syria and Lebanon. Against this backdrop, the conclusion of the fourth round of US-Iran talks is a positive development for the Gulf nations. The UAE delivered President Trump’s letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Khamenei, while Oman hosted and continue to host the negotiations. These details underscored the Gulf’s direct involvement in the negotiations. If a broad or narrow agreement materializes soon, the Gulf states will gain significance – as US intermediaries and as partners advancing dialogue with Iran. Yet any US-Iran accord remains vulnerable to spoilers: Israel, reckless moves by Iranian militias, or the Houthis’ growing transnational reach.
#2. SS: U.S. President Donald Trump has sought to add more Arab countries to the Abraham Accords with Israel. UAE, Bahrain. Morocco and Sudan have participated, and there is pressure on Oman to sign. In your view, what are the benefits from signing the Accords?
EG: From 2016 to 2020, the Trump administration’s paramount focus was normalization. Today, however, it has receded to the back burner due to the ongoing Israeli brutality in Gaza. Yet, being sidelined does not mean normalization with Israel has been shelved entirely. For some time, U.S. administrations have viewed Saudi Arabia as the “grand prize” in this process—and Netanyahu shares that perspective. Nevertheless, in the midst of the Gaza conflict, a normalization agreement with Israel would be extremely difficult for Gulf, or other Arab states, to justify publicly. Outside the calculus of war, normalization essentially means forging economic ties with Israel, strengthening military cooperation, and deepening relations with the U.S. Despite all its potential benefits, in the near future it would be a political move nearly impossible to sell to Gulf or Arab public opinion.
#3. SS: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said one of his main goals was to have Saudi Arabia sign the Abraham Accords. However, the ongoing genocide on Gaza, carried out by Israel, has put a halt to any activity on the Abraham Accords. In your opinion, will Saudi Arabia maintain their stance on demanding a two-state solution?
EG: Since the 2003 Arab Peace Initiative, Saudi Arabia has hinted at normalizing ties with Israel—on the condition that it springs from a Two-State Solution. Before the Gaza onslaught, U.S. administrations bent over backwards to smooth the path. For Riyadh, normalization is a pivotal threshold in regional politics—after all, its chief Gulf rival, the UAE, has already reaped dividends from warming ties with Israel. Yet, in a post-Gaza calculus, rushing normalization within a 3- to 6-month window could spark severe political fallout for Saudi Arabia. Still, Israel’s enduring presence in regional geopolitics—and Riyadh’s long-standing interest—means normalization could arise eventually, using it as a forum that advances a Two-State dialogue. But the where and when, as Trump once emphasized, is a decision for the Saudis alone.
#4. SS: The Arab Gulf countries have expressed an interest in rebuilding Syria after the civil war destroyed many parts of the country. In your opinion, what will be the role of the UAE and any other Gulf countries in Syria?
EG: While Qatar maintained a continuous line of communication with Sharaa’s government, and Saudi Arabia only reengaged with Damascus once shifting regional dynamics compelled its hand, the UAE’s approach stands out as particularly consequential. In Abu Dhabi’s case, the leadership first invested substantial political and economic capital in supporting Assad’s regime—whether through probable financial aid, intelligence sharing, or facilitating humanitarian corridors under pro-Assad auspices. Only after this period of significant backing did the UAE execute an unequivocal pivot toward reintegration, effectively erasing previous barriers and signaling full endorsement of Syria’s post-conflict order. This sequence—first bolstering Assad, then openly re-establishing formal ties—underscores the UAE’s calculated risk-taking and its willingness to leverage its influence for maximum strategic return.
#5. SS: Yemen has been in conflict with Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for years. The Iran-backed resistance in Yemen has carried out attacks on the shipping lanes in the Gulf, as well as attacks on Israel. In your view, will the Yemen conflict be resolved, and who are the players involved in restoring peace to the area?
EG: Yemen presents a military and political puzzle that is unlikely to be unraveled anytime soon. As much as the post–October 7 developments weakened Iran, they equally seemed to have empowered the Houthis to become a cross-border actor. Now that they can strike not only inside Yemen but also at U.S. forces and Israeli territory, they wield in-the-field gains as domestic leverage. In turn, this has made the once-ongoing Saudi–Houthi dialogue impossible for the time being; the Houthis insist that any new talks hinge on an immediate halt to Israeli attacks in Gaza. Simply put, militarily eliminating the Houthis is unfeasible, and devising a political solution that excludes them is virtually impossible in Yemen’s fractured landscape. Of course, any international settlement would involve key regional and global players—Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, alongside the U.S. and Russia—but Yemen has fallen far down the international agenda, overshadowed by crises in Gaza, Syria, and Ukraine.
Steven Sahiounie is a two-time awrd-winning journalist.
