Steven Sahiounie, journalist and political commentator
As Israel approaches another pivotal political moment, questions surrounding the future of its government, the direction of its military doctrine, and the fate of the Palestinian people remain more urgent than ever. But will a change in political leadership bring any meaningful shift in Israel’s policies toward Palestinians, or will it simply repackage the same system of occupation, settlement expansion, displacement, and military aggression under a different political face?
Journalist Steven Sahiounie interviewed Palestinian writer and researcher, Ahmed Tanani, from Gaza.
#1. Steven Sahiounie (SS): How will the formation of the next Israeli government affect Palestinians living inside the territories occupied in 1948, as well as residents of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip? Could we witness an escalation in discriminatory policies, restrictions, and forced displacement, or might political changes within Israel open a limited window for reviving the Palestinian political process?
Ahmed Tanani (AT): In any case, one of the most prominent areas of programmatic overlap between the Israeli opposition parties and the current right-wing governing coalition, led by Benjamin Netanyahu in partnership with Religious Zionism parties, is their position on Palestinian rights. Almost no political party openly and explicitly supports a two-state solution or granting Palestinians political rights. The only limited and relative exception is the Democrats Party (an alliance of Labor and Meretz), which represents what remains of the Israeli left. Even this party, however, surrounds its position with numerous security and political restrictions that reduce any form of Palestinian self-determination to a form of non-sovereign self-rule.
Consequently, regardless of the composition of the next governing coalition, confrontational policies toward the Palestinian people will remain in place, even if the manner in which they are expressed changes. These policies may take the form of the blunt ideological rhetoric expressed in the statements and visions of Religious Zionism leaders, which we have witnessed over the past four years, or they may be articulated by leaders of a future coalition primarily through a security and military framework. In the latter case, aggressive positions will be justified as security necessities.
This includes refusing to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, insisting on conditions such as the “disarmament and dismantling of Palestinian resistance factions” in the Strip, and invoking security imperatives and the need to prevent scenarios similar to October 7. It also includes citing fears of a “turning of the guns” or the outbreak of an uprising in the West Bank as justification for maintaining Israeli security control.
There may, however, be slight changes concerning rights and a reduction in pressure on Palestinians inside the 1948 territories, given the political weight they have demonstrated in the Knesset. This could become a decisive factor in determining whether a government can be formed.
Another important distinction is that any future governing coalition will prioritize the goal of “breaking Israel’s international isolation.” Accordingly, it will seek to reduce practices that could be interpreted as a continuation of genocide and ethnic cleansing, instead adopting aggressive policies presented as a shift from genocide toward targeted and limited security operations.
This shift will be accompanied by an extensive public relations campaign seeking to place responsibility for the genocide on Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition, while distancing Israel as a broader entity, including its institutions, from that responsibility.
Such an approach would help open a new chapter with the international community and promote the image of the new government as more civilized and more aligned with Western values, while continuing to implement repressive and aggressive policies against the Palestinian people on the ground.
#2. SS: Will the Israeli elections change the face of the government, or will they simply reproduce the same political and settlement project under new leadership and alliances?
AT: Naturally, the current opposition figures, or those described as the “Change Camp,” are not outsiders to Israeli politics in recent years. Nor are they outsiders to the institutions that have governed and shaped Israeli conduct.
For example, Avigdor Lieberman previously served as Israel’s Minister of Defense, as did Naftali Bennett, and both are far-right figures. Meanwhile, Eisenkot, who is expected to become prime minister, is a former Chief of Staff and one of the architects of destructive military operations, particularly what became known as the “Dahiya Doctrine,” as well as the strategy of the “Campaign Between Wars.” The latter allows the Israeli military to maintain freedom of action and carry out assassinations and strikes without being constrained by formal agreements.
Eisenkot was also a member of the War Cabinet during the first months of the genocidal war, a period that witnessed some of the largest massacres committed by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip.
Therefore, talk of a qualitative change is largely limited and marginal, despite differences in the theoretical approaches adopted by various figures within the Change Camp regarding Palestinians and how to manage the conflict.
These differences range from Netanyahu’s strategy of “managing the conflict” to Naftali Bennett’s approach of “reducing the conflict,” an approach broadly shared by figures within the Change Camp. It is based on replacing political rights with economic incentives and improvements, while maintaining the security grip over the Palestinian population.
All leaders within the Change Camp insist that every approach must remain fundamentally security-oriented. Each has a different position regarding the Palestinian Authority and how it should be dealt with, but they all essentially view its role as limited to security matters, without granting it any meaningful political space that could lead to genuine sovereignty.
Their position on settlements, meanwhile, remains ambiguous. Most likely, any measures taken will be largely symbolic and public-relations-oriented, aimed at restraining the conduct of extremist settler groups in order to present a more acceptable image to the international community.
However, these measures are unlikely to produce any meaningful change in the realities created by settlement expansion. This must be considered alongside the fact that Naftali Bennett, one of the leading figures in the Change Camp, comes from the Religious Zionist movement and is a strong advocate of settlement expansion.
#3. SS: Is Benjamin Netanyahu the main obstacle to reshaping Israel’s political landscape, or does he remain the figure most capable of uniting the various factions of the Israeli right? If he leaves office, could we witness a genuine transformation in Israel’s political and security doctrine, or has Netanyahu simply become the embodiment of a broader trend within Israeli society?
AT: In practical terms, Benjamin Netanyahu is the central figure around whom the opposition has united. He is therefore a major factor in the division within the right-wing camp.
His presence is what has driven certain right-wing figures seeking to remove him, such as Avigdor Lieberman and Naftali Bennett, to form alliances with Yair Golan and the Democrats Party, which represents what remains of the Zionist left.
The point of convergence between these parties is neither programmatic nor ideological. Rather, it is their shared agreement on removing Benjamin Netanyahu from the political scene. Once that objective is achieved, each party is likely to return to its own ideological position.
Benjamin Netanyahu represents his own particular version of the right, one that mobilizes all available resources to serve his political vision, including consolidating his absolute dominance and confronting what he describes as the “deep state.”
He views this so-called deep state as representing the liberal establishment, which fundamentally upholds the separation of powers and the strengthening of the judiciary, thereby placing limits on the conduct of the executive branch and the Knesset majority.
He has also introduced changes to the leadership of Israel’s security and military agencies, driven by his need for personal loyalty rather than merely ideological alignment.
This approach has coincided with the opportunism of Religious Zionism parties, which have their own ideological visions and require an alliance of this kind. Under this arrangement, Netanyahu gets what he wants politically, while these parties secure the implementation of some of their most extreme ideological positions as government policy.
Right-wing opposition leaders aspire to become the leaders of the entire right-wing camp once Benjamin Netanyahu is removed from the political scene.
For example, Lieberman, who was previously a member of Likud, hopes that removing Netanyahu from politics and preventing him from running for prime minister again will create an opportunity for him to become the figure capable of reuniting the Zionist right.
The same applies to certain members of the Bennett-Lapid lists and Eisenkot’s party, who see themselves as naturally belonging within Likud, but without Netanyahu.
As for changes in Israel’s security and military doctrine, what is currently taking place is a shift in how Israeli security and military institutions approach the strategies that historically governed their conduct during Netanyahu’s years in power.
These institutions are increasingly inclined toward adopting more offensive doctrines, based on preventing any opposing force from accumulating military strength along the borders of the occupied Palestinian territories and moving rapidly toward overwhelming attacks.
This will ensure that Israel’s aggressive military pattern remains in place until Israel recognizes the costs of this approach and the need to reduce its intensity.
It is important to recognize that the shift toward the far right in Israel, as well as the increasingly violent and aggressive positions, reflects deeper changes within both state institutions and Israeli public opinion and society.
#4. SS: What scenarios are expected for the future of the Gaza Strip under the next Israeli government? Will Israel continue direct military control, impose a Palestinian administration under Israeli supervision, or pursue regional and international arrangements to govern the Strip? And what are the chances of success for each of these scenarios?
AT: The central issue is that all political factions remain committed to US President Donald Trump’s plan for the Gaza Strip. This plan carries substantial risks and is consistent with Israel’s security-oriented vision for the future of Gaza.
Furthermore, none of the political factions wants to enter into a confrontation with the Trump administration, which aspires for the Board of Peace to play a broader role extending beyond the Gaza Strip. For that reason, the plan must first succeed in Gaza.
However, this does not mean that either political camp or its leaders are prepared to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, ease the blockade, or allow reconstruction to proceed.
Consequently, the prevailing approach is likely to remain the current one: maneuvering to strip the agreement of its substance and exploiting it politically to reduce criticism of Israel without making any substantive concessions.
This approach may involve tactical differences over certain implementation details. For instance, Eisenkot may be more willing to allow the entry of the technocratic committee or facilitate the deployment of an international force, in contrast to Netanyahu’s intransigence and deliberate delays.
The fundamental difference is that Benjamin Netanyahu remains trapped by the issue of “failure” on October 7 and the prospect of establishing an official commission of inquiry and conducting an official review.
For Netanyahu, ending the war would open the door to questions about responsibility, the strategic outcome, and whether the war’s objectives have actually been achieved.
Maintaining a clearly defined state of ongoing warfare therefore serves his political interests.
Eisenkot, by contrast, is not constrained by the same political considerations. This gives him greater room to pursue broader approaches that the United States could offer regarding the future of the region, including reviving normalization efforts with Saudi Arabia.
Within this framework, he might be willing to make tactical concessions in exchange for a broader regional settlement.
Overall, this suggests that the current evasive approach toward Trump’s plan will continue. The plan will remain a prominent political framework, but this does not indicate that Gaza will be able to catch its breath anytime soon or have a genuine opportunity to rebuild the foundations of civilian life.
#5. SS: How will the results of the Israeli elections affect the future of ceasefire agreements and the role of Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye, and other Arab countries in post-war arrangements? Will the US administration be able to impose a political vision on the next Israeli government regarding Gaza, or will the Israeli right continue to impose its conditions even on its ally in Washington?
AT: In any case, the agreement will remain the primary framework governing future relations. However, its provisions contain fundamental structural flaws.
These flaws are linked to the fact that Israel has effectively been granted veto power over all the required commitments, since it is a party to determining whether the Palestinian resistance has complied with the agreement. Israel is also the party that determines the interpretations necessary for implementing each provision.
Furthermore, the agreement links Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction, the two most fundamental issues, to the question of “disarmament.”
Israel has its own definitions of disarmament, which cannot realistically be achieved because its objective is to undermine the Palestinian people’s right to resist occupation, rather than simply to eliminate weapons in their physical form.
The main difference is that sharply ideological positions concerning Gaza’s future are likely to recede in favor of more security- and military-oriented approaches.
At the same time, the lack of strategic consensus among the components of any future governing coalition will remain a persistent obstacle to improving conditions in the Gaza Strip in a manner that fulfills the provisions of the US plan.
These provisions include enabling the transitional Palestinian administration to function, opening border crossings, improving humanitarian conditions, beginning reconstruction, and establishing a timetable for Israeli withdrawal.
All the leading figures within the Change Camp, just like the current right-wing coalition, remain committed to the principle of granting the Israeli occupation army “freedom of action.”
This means that the continuation of daily attacks and killings remains the most likely scenario, although limited humanitarian improvements may be introduced in response to international pressure.
Regarding the role of mediators, the Israeli position will remain cautious and reserved, particularly toward Türkiye and Qatar.
This issue previously served as a point of political competition in attempts to portray Netanyahu as insufficiently tough. It is therefore unlikely that leaders of the Change Camp will demonstrate greater flexibility on this matter.
Egypt, however, will retain a central role because of its distinct weight in the Gaza equation and its relationship with Israel, as well as its ability to bring Palestinian factions together and advance negotiations with all of them.
The fundamental problem lies in the fact that the agreement is under exclusive American sponsorship, while the Board of Peace remains under US control.
The administration of President Donald Trump has demonstrated a superficial approach to the issue, showing little genuine concern for Palestinian suffering or the scale of casualties and destruction.
Instead, its primary concern appears to be demonstrating that the Board of Peace is functioning and achieving results, even if those achievements are merely symbolic or illusory.
Moreover, the administration has already adopted the Israeli narrative and shares Israel’s strategic security vision, particularly regarding the future of the Gaza Strip.
Its superficial approach also represents an obstacle, as it allows the Israeli occupation to engage in deception and manipulation, gradually stripping the agreement of its substance.
The Trump administration appears largely indifferent to implementation details, giving Israel considerable power to control the agenda and determine the direction of developments.
Consequently, the main path toward changing realities in the Gaza Strip lies in more meaningful engagement by Arab and Islamic countries.
In particular, the eight Arab and Islamic countries involved in launching President Donald Trump’s plan must exert serious pressure on the United States to intervene more effectively.
Such intervention should help alleviate the catastrophe in Gaza and prevent the agreement from becoming a cover for the continuation of genocide and its devastating consequences.
Otherwise, the Israeli occupation will continue pushing conditions toward what can be described as the “sustainability of genocide,” whereby every aspect of life in the Gaza Strip becomes part of an ongoing cycle of death, while the option of forced displacement remains ever-present.
Steven Sahiounie is a two-time award-winning journalist.

